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In this Article, we use evidence gathered from employment arbitration 
cases arising in the securities industry to address several research questions 
that emanate from the debate over the arbitration of employment disputes. 
We empirically answer the following questions: (I) Are critics correct in 
asserting that employment arbitration favors repeat players? (2) Do 
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mandatory arbitration? (3) Are employees who allege violations of their 
civil rights, through the filing of discrimination charges, treated differently 
from those filing other types of claims? (4) Does the gender of the parties 
involved in the arbitration process affect outcomes in any way? (5) Is there 
evidence that companies learn from, or are affected by, the results of prior 
arbitration awards when dealing with a current claim? Although the 
literature has offered some answers to these questions, this Article provides 
a holistic review and overview of the arbitration experience within the 
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INTRODUCTION
The arbitration of employment disputes has been the subject of intense
interest in recent years. Proponents of the practice maintain that arbitration
provides a faster and cheaper means of resolving employment disputes than
litigation, and several seminal Supreme Court decisions have reinforced
support for the use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes.'
Opponents of the practice argue that arbitration is not an adequate substitute
for a judicial forum because it does not provide a level playing field for
employment disputes. Among other concerns, for instance, critics of the
practice maintain that experienced employers typically enjoy advantages in
arbitration over inexperienced employees. The so-called repeat player effect
holds that sophisticated employers, by virtue of their knowledge of and
experience in the arbitration process, are likely to have an edge over
employees, who are much less likely to have had any previous experience in
arbitration.^
Critics have especially expressed their concerns about mandatory
arbitration. Congress has recently considered a bill called the Arbitration
Fairness Act ("AFA"), which would amend the Federal Arbitration Act to
ban the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment,
consumer, franchise, and civil rights disputes.^ A pre-dispute arbitration
agreement results when Party A (for example, an employer) requires Party B
(for example, an employee) to sign an agreement waiving Party B's right to
adjudicate future disputes arising out of their relationship, and instead
requires Party B to submit those disputes to arbitration. The sponsors of the
AFA, reflecting the views of several interest groups that have long criticized
mandatory arbitration agreements, critique mandatory arbitration in the
proposed legislation's findings. For example, the AFA sponsors assert that
mandatory arbitration "undermines the development of public law for civil
rights and consumer rights, because there is no meaningful judicial review
of arbitrators' decisions."" The sponsors maintain that "arbitrators enjoy
1. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
2. For a discussion of the repeat-player effect, see Ronald L. Seeber & David B. Lipsky, The
Ascendancy of Employment Arbitrators in U.S. Employment Relations: A New Actor in the American
System?, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 719, 729-36 (2006).
3. Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R.1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (House bill); S. 931 111th Cong.
(2009) (Senate bill). The AFA is actually a series of amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act.
4. See Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(5) (2009).
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near complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules" because
they know that "their rulings will not be seriously examined by a court
applying current law."^
In this Article, we use the evidence we have gathered from cases arising
in the securities industry to address several research questions that emanate
from the debate over the arbitration of employment disputes. The answers
should contribute to our assessment of the validity of some of the claims
made by both the proponents and opponents of mandatory employment
arbitration. For example, are critics correct in asserting that employment
arbitration favors repeat players? Do employees fare better under voluntary
arbitration than they do under mandatory arbitration? Are employees who
allege violations of their civil rights, through the filing of discrimination
charges, treated differently from those filing other types of claims? Does the
gender of the parties involved in the arbitration process affect outcomes in
any way? Is there evidence that companies learn from, or are affected by,
the results of prior arbitration awards when dealing with a current claim?
Although empirical answers to each of these questions can be (and, in many
cases, have been) explored in the literature, this Article provides a holistic
review and overview of the arbitration experience within the securities
industry and provides a summation of quantitative evidence on the subject.*
I.
FINRA's ARBITRATION PROGRAM
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") regulates
nearly 5,000 securities firms in the U.S., along with their 633,000
representatives.' One of FINRA's primary responsibilities involves the
administration of an ADR program for the resolution of disputes between
customers and brokers (seventy-flve percent of all filings), brokers and
5. H.R. 1020 § 2(5).
6. In providing a holistic overview of current empirical research into securities arbitration,
portions of this paper draw directly from a series of unique articles we have written or are currently
writing on the topic. In drawing on these sources, excerpts are either used verbatim or paraphrased from
the following published and working papers: David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber & J. Ryan Lamare, The
Arbitration of Employment Disputes in the Securities Industry: A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008, 65
DISP. RESOL. J. 54 (2010); David B. Lipsky, J. Ryan Lamare, & Abhishek Gupta, The Effect of Gender
on Awards in Employment Arbitration Cases: The Experience in the Securities Industry, 52 INDUS. REL.
SI, 314 (2013); J. Ryan Lamare, The Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases in the Securities
Industry, 68 DlSP. RESOL. J. 97 (2013) [hereinafter Securities]; J. Ryan Lamare & David B. Lipsky,
Resolving Discrimination Complaints in Employment Arbitration: An Analysis of the Experience in the
Securities Industry (Working Paper, 2013) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Resolving Discrimination
Complaints]; J. Ryan Lamare and David B. Lipsky, The Repeat-Player Effect on Employment Arbitration
Awards: Evidence from the Financial Industry (Working Paper 2013) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
The Repeat-Player Effect]. Citations to these published and unpublished manuscripts are provided
whenever materials from these sources are used.
7. Lipsky, Lamare, & Gupta, supra note 6, at 322.
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brokers (two percent of filings), and employees and their firms (twenty-three
percent of filings).* The FINRA employment dispute resolution program
covers only "associated persons" in the securities industry; associated
persons are employees who are registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and can accept and execute customers' buy-and-sell orders.'
"It is estimated that about one-third of the employees in the industry are
registered representatives.'"" When a claim is made under this system, a
filing fee is required from the claimant. This can range fiom $50 (for claims
of $1,000 or less) to $1,800 (for claims greater than $1 million). In cases
alleging employment discrimination, the maximum claim fee is $200.
There are approximately 6,400 arbitrators on the FINRA roster."
Arbitrators are either public (who are not required to have knowledge of or
connection to the securities industry) or non-public (who have a securities
industry background). All arbitrators must complete at least a basic training
course prior to becoming eligible to be listed on the FINRA roster.'^
Arbitrators must agree to abide by the American Bar Association's Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes as well as FINRA's Code of
Arbitration Procedure.'^ In addition, before every case, arbitrators must
provide a disclosure report, which gives information on all relationships the
arbitrator might have with the parties and/or conflicts of interest.'" The
arbitrator must also sign an oath declaring his or her impartiality.'^ FINRA
pays its arbitrators at most $200 per four-hour hearing session, with an
additional maximum premium of $75 per day for chairpersons."^ Cases are
heard in seventy-two locations within all fifty states, plus Puerto Rico and
London. Arbitrators are assigned to primary locations based on their
residence and are included on the lists sent to parties in that location."
8. Id at 322-23.
9. Id at 323.
10. Id. We use the term "employee" to refer only to registered representatives.
11. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FiN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.nnra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/
(lastvisitedFeb. 6, 2014).
12. Required Basic Arbitrator Training, FiN. INDUS. REG. AUTH.,
http://www.fmra.org/ArbitrationAndM ediation/Arbitrators/Training/RequiredBasicArbitratorTraining/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
13. Responsibilities, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.nnra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitrators/Responsibilites/ [sic] (lastvisitedFeb. 6, 2014).
14. Arbitrator Disclosure, FiN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.fmra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/Responsibilites/Disclosures/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
15. Oath of Arbitrator, FiN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.fmra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitrators/Responsibilites/OathofArbitrator/index.htm [sic] (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
16. Honorarium, FiN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.nnra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitrators/AdministrativeResources/Honorarium/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
17. Hearings, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://virww.fmra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitration/Process/Hearings/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
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The financial crisis that began in 2008 led directly to a dramatic
increase in FINRA case filings, from 3,238 in 2007 to 4,982 in 2008 and to
7,137 in 2009.'* In other words, the FINRA caseload more than doubled
between 2007 and 2009, and it increased by forty-three percent between
2008 and 2009." Although an analysis of the customer-broker cases would
be valuable, our interest in employment relations led us to focus on the
employment claims heard under FINRA auspices.
The FINRA system for arbitrator selection currently works as follows.
If an employee claims $50,000 or less, a single arbitrator is appointed at
random and a "simplified arbitration" occurs, wherein no hearing sessions
will be held unless the claimant requests one.^ ° For claims between $50,000
and $100,000, FINRA provides each party with a list of ten randomly-
selected, "chair-qualified" public arbitrators.^' Both parties strike at most
four arbitrators from the list and rank the remainder; FINRA then selects the
highest ranked available arbitrator, and a normal hearing is held.^ ^ Cases
with higher claim amounts are heard by a tripartite panel; in these cases,
parties each receive three lists often arbitrators: a chair-qualified public list,
an additional public list, and a non-public list.^' The parties then follow the
same process of striking and ranking as outlined above.
The system provides different rules for arbitrations concerning statutory
discrimination claims. For instance, the maximum filing fee for
discrimination claims is $200, whereas the fee can rise as high as $1,800 for
non-discrimination cases.^" In addition, beginning in 2000, FINRA
instituted stricter requirements regarding the composition of arbitration
panels when discrimination has been alleged." In these cases, tripartite
panels must consist of all public arbitrators (rather than a mixture of public
and industry arbitrators), and the chair (or sole) arbitrator cannot have
primarily represented employers or employees in the past five years.^ *"
Over the past twenty years, a substantial debate has arisen regarding the
effectiveness and fairness of the arbitration process rules.^' As a
18. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 11.
19. Id
20. Arbitrator Selection, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitration/Process/ArbitratorSelection/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6,2014).
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Id
24. Rule 13802—Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, FlN. INDUS. REG. AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4284
(lastvisitedFeb. 6, 2014).
25. Rule SR-NASD-1999-008, FiN. INDUS. REG. AuTH., http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/
RuleFilings/1999/P001284 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
26. Id
27. See, e.g., Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2001); Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson,
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consequence, a tremendous amount has been written on securities
arbitration, including an array of opinion pieces, regulatory assessments, and
scholarly articles. Within this vast literature, a primary complaint alleges
that FINRA arbitration rules have tilted disputes in favor of the industry at
the expense of investors and other claimants.^^
The securities industry has often found itself at the forefront of the
employment and consumer arbitration conversation, particularly discussions
about the changing availability and usage of arbitration over the past several
decades. Several of the Supreme Court's most important decisions
regarding employment and consumer arbitration originated in the securities
industry. For example, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon held that
investors who sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements with their brokers
could be compelled to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities and
Exchange Act,^ '^  and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc. overturned Wilko v. Swan, which held that claims arising under the
Securities Act could not be compelled to arbitration by means of a
contract.^"
Most critically for employment relations, the Supreme Court's seminal
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.^^ held that a broker-
employee who had signed a registration form with the SEC requiring the use
of arbitration to resolve statutory claims had waived his right to take an age
discrimination claim to federal court. The Gilmer case is widely credited
with ushering in the widespread use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in employment relations.^^
n.
FINDINGS FROM OUR EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO FINRA AWARDS
We provide the most comprehensive analysis of employment arbitration
within the FINRA system to date. Our data cover the full spectrum of
awards issued by FINRA from the implementation of securities employment
Substantive Fairness in Securities Regulation, 76 U. CiN. L. REV. 459 (2008); Jill I. Gross & Barbara
Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors ' Views of the Fairness of
Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DiSP. RESOL. 349 (2008).; Stephen J. Choi & Theodore Eisenberg,
Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 497 (2010); Stephen
J. Choi, JuU E. Fisch, & A. C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (2010).
28. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to
Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C.L. REV. 123 (2005) (examining the National Association of Securities
Dealers which oversees most securities arbitrations); Brunet & Johnson, supra note 27.
29. See 482 U.S. 220,242 (1987).
30. 490 U.S. 477, 480-82 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
31. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
32. For a discussion of the significance of Gilmer, see DAVID B . LIPSKY, RONALD L. SEEBER, &
RICHARD D. FINCHER, EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 198-212 (2003).
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arbitration through 2006. In 2007, we purchased data files from FINRA that
provided information on: award amounts; claim amounts; characteristics of
claimant-employees, respondent-employers, arbitrators, and attorneys;
hearing length and location; claim filing and award issuance dates;
allegations made by employees; any counterclaims made by employers. This
information was included on an award-by-award basis over the lifespan of
the FINRA system, totaling 3,200 cases. We cleaned and coded the data so
that it was suitable for empirical analysis, either on our own or in
conjunction with graduate students at Cornell University's ILR School.
Arbitrators in the FINRA system were tasked with handling a variety of
different types of employment disputes over the period studied. Figure 1
shows the types of claims made by employees in the 3,200 cases we
analyzed: in 22.9 percent of the cases employees claimed their employer had
denied them compensation they had been owed; in 35.2 percent of the cases
employees claimed their employer had defamed them in some fashion (e.g.,
by alleging they had "churned" a customer's account); in 20.8 percent of the
cases employees claimed they had been wrongfully terminated; and in 29.3
percent of the cases employees claimed their employer breached their
contract. Cases involving a claim of statutory discrimination constituted
18.9 percent of the total.
Frequency of Allegations
1986-2007
• Discrimination
• Breach of Contract
ííí. Compensation
• Defamation
D Wrongful Termination
Figure 1: Frequency of Distribution of All FINRA Case Allegations
In every case the employee (and his or her attorney) presented the
arbitrator with a monetary figure representing the damages associated with
the claim. The figure presented to the arbitrator usually included the
33. J. Ryan Lamare, The Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases in the Securities
Industry, 68 DiSP. RESOL. J. 97 (2013).
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claimant's demand for back pay and often punitive damages as well. The
employers in these cases always denied that the employees' claims had merit
and sometimes filed counterclaims. The employer's position in each of
these cases was that the arbitrator should not award the employee-claimant
any money at all.
Our analysis of the FINRA awards casts light on flve major
considerations for assessing the suitability of employment arbitration. First,
do repeat players (usually employers) have an advantage over one-shot
players (usually employees)? Second, are there differences in outcomes
depending on whether the system is mandatory or voluntary? Third, are
parties awarded different amounts depending on the gender of the employee,
his or her attorney, the employer's attorney, or the chair arbitrator? Fourth,
do arbitration outcomes differ depending on the employee's allegation? In
particular, are employees treated differently if they take statutory
discrimination claims to arbitration when compared against other types of
allegations? Fifth, can we assess, using empirical measures, the extent to
which companies treat each arbitration separately, or whether a given
arbitration is influenced by a firm's prior outcome? Each of these questions
will be fully answered in the following sections. In answering these
questions, we rely on evidence gleaned from our published articles,
unpublished working papers, and new or previously unreported empirical
anlaysis.
A. Evidence of a Repeat-Player Effect Within the FINRA System^^
Research assessing the adequacy and fairness of arbitration in resolving
employment disputes has raised the problematic possibility that parties who
engage in arbitration the most will enjoy inherent advantages over parties
who are one-time users of the system. This has been termed the repeat-
player effect. Although some empirical studies of repeat-player effects
exist, many gaps remain in this literature. The first formal conceptualization
of repeat players, compared against one-shot players, comes from Marc
Galanter.^ ^ Galanter argues that in any legal system repeat players gamer
advantages over one-shot players for several reasons: repeat players are
more knowledgeable about the forum in which they operate, having been
there before; they have access to specialists on the issue; they are able to
develop informal institutional relationships; they are viewed as more
committed to certain bargaining positions; they are able to take more risks;
they can use their influence to lobby for favorable rules; and they are more
34. Portions of this section are drawn or paraphrased from the unpublished manuscript, Lamare
and Lipsky, The Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 6.
35. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
2014 EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 121
likely to invest greater resources in order to affect the mies.'* Conversely,
one-shot players have more to lose; may employ risk-averse strategies; have
no interest in long-term gains or relationships; are unconcemed with
precedent and future mle changes; have no institutional relationship; have
no knowledge-experience base from which to draw; and have lesser access
to advocates who are experts on the issue.^ ^ This, according to Galanter,
contributes to a legal system in which the "haves" (typically large, well-
resourced firms) enjoy significant advantages over the "have-nots"
(aggrieved individuals).'*
Galanter's repeat-player theory was first applied to the employment
arbitration setting by Lisa Bingham,'' who determined that employers
involved in multiple arbitration cases did better than those engaging in only
a single case. In explaining this finding, Bingham suggested legitimate
reasons related to arbitration policy distinctions between one-shot players
and repeat players, as well as the possibility that experienced repeat players
could more easily identify and settle unwinnable cases. Bingham also
suggested that pro-employer bias might exist within employment arbitration,
where arbitrators would favor firms in order to gain future business.
However, these results have been challenged on grounds related to sample
size and tmncation problems, as well as concems that her findings of
possible arbitrator bias may have been conflated with issues related to
employer size, experience, and institutional memory.''"
Alexander Colvin's work overcomes many of these problems."' He
used a larger sample, a broader timeframe (2003 to 2007), and a more
nuanced analysis of possible employer-arbitrator biases. Colvin maintains
that repeat-player effects might be serving as a proxy for size effects.
Larger employers are more likely to repeat. These firms may also enjoy
certain advantages such as resource availability, legal expertise, and
knowledge of the arbitral fomm; might adopt HR practices that ensure fairer
employment decisions; and could be more likely to settle meritorious cases
using intemal grievance systems."^ Employing a quantitative analysis of
American Arbitration Association (AAA) data, Colvin finds a considerable
36. M at 98-103.
37. Id
38. Id at 103-04.
39. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'YJ. 189(1997).
40. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Fomm at Low Cost, 58 DlSP. RESOL. J. 8
(2003); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment
Arbitration: A New Direction for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2005); Alexander J. S.
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011).
41. Colvin, .supra note 40.
42. Id at 12.
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repeat-player effect, but attributes this to inherent advantages available to
large employers, rather than systemic bias."^ Colvin also finds a smaller, but
still significant, repeat player-arbitrator effect, where employers selecting
the same arbitrator multiple times tend to receive favorable outcomes.""
Colvin argues that this finding does indeed indicate pro-employer arbitrator
bias, attributable to both arbitrators' hope for future business from
employers and also to repetitious firms' greater expertise in selecting pro-
employer arbitrators."^
However, issues remain to be resolved within this literature. All repeat-
player studies have faced problems of sample truncation, where the available
data are unable to capture the full range of awards since the arbitration
system's inception. Without including all awards over a system's lifetime,
the data used to analyze repetition effects cannot ensure that parties
identified as one-shot players did not participate in cases within the system
prior to the timeframe chosen for analysis. In addition, published studies on
repetition have treated the key independent variable in only a dichotomized
manner; thus, all repeat players are treated equally when being measured
against those who do not repeat.
Similarly, in terms of dependent variables, the most robust quantitative
research into repetition effects on employment arbitration has measured only
the total monetary amounts awarded and dichotomized "win/loss" outcomes,
where any value over zero counts as an employee victory. As Colvin notes,
this is an extremely narrow definition of what might constitute a "win" for
one side and a "loss" for another."* Further, although studies suggest that
access to expert lawyers may explain the repeat-player results, no work on
the subject has fully accounted for attorney effects. Finally, all studies on
the subject suffer from substantial omitted variable problems.
Our analysis of FINRA cases overcomes many of these issues and, in so
doing, provides the most complete analysis to date of repeat-player effects
on employment arbitration. For one, we have a non-truncated sample of all
decisions rendered within the FINRA employment arbitration system since
its beginning. For another, we are able to consider degrees of experience.
This allows us to account for the effects of increasing levels of experience
on arbitration outcomes. Additionally, we include attorney and chair
arbitrator repetition in our final analysis, as well as employer repetition.
Further, we are able to capture both relative (percent-based) and absolute
(award sum-based) measures of awards. This overcomes concerns regarding
the difficulty in determining what constitutes a "win" when absolute
monetary values are used and also mitigates issues over the possibility of
43. M at 21.
44. M at 21.
45. Id at 12, 14-15.
46. Id ati.
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inflated claims artificially depressing relative award results. Finally, we
control for an array of factors that might also affect outcomes, including the
claim size, gender, location, year, case complexity, and allegations.
We find some evidence of repetition and experience effects within the
FINRA system, as indicated by Table 1. After controlling for the location of
the arbitration hearing, the complexity of the case, the size of the initial
amount claimed by employees, time, and party characteristics, we find that,
with every additional FINRA arbitration case in which an employer
participates, employees are considerably less likely to win larger shares of
their initial claim amounts. As arbitrators become more experienced in the
FINRA system, they also tend to more heavily favor employers, at least with
regard to awards relative to claim size. However, we find no significant
effects of multiple pairings of the same employer and arbitrator on relative
awards. Nor does increasing attorney experience affect award outcomes for
either party.
Increases in Employer's
Experience
Increases in Employee
Attomey's Experience
Increases in Employer
Attomey's Experience
Increaes in Arbitrator's
Experience
Repeated Pairs of Firms
and Arbitrators
Percent-Based Measure
of Award Outcomes
Negative Effect on Employee
Outcomes
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
Negative Effect on Employee
Outcomes
No Effect on Awards
Absolute Measure
of Award Outcomes
Negative Effect on Employee
Outcomes
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
47Table 1 : Repeat-Player Effects within the FINRA System
These results do not necessarily suggest that the arbitration system
under FINRA is biased to benefit employers. Colvin finds the most
compelling empirical evidence of bias in employment arbitration by testing
the effects of matched employer-arbitrator pairs on awards in the AAA
system.**^  Colvin's outcomes support the assertions that arbitrators will
unfairly favor employers in the hope that this will lead to future business,
and that repeat employers are able to identify and select biased arbitrators.''^
Generally, our study finds a different result from that of Colvin. Our
47. Controls: Hearing location, case complexity, initial amount claimed, party characteristics,
allegations, time.
48. M a t 21. 1
49. Id
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findings suggest that the FINRA system may have been largely successful in
protecting against selection effects and overt employer bias. Throughout the
twenty-year period we study, only 2.3 percent of cases involved employer-
arbitrator pairs matched multiple times, considerably lower than the 15.9
percent Colvin finds in the AAA data. In 1998, FINRA introduced a system
of automated panel selection, which may have adequately mitigated the
possibility that employers are able to select arbitrators multiple times based
on past history. Even when arbitrators and employers do have a prior
relationship in the system, the safeguards FINRA has put into place to
protect against bias (in the form of disclosure statements, sworn oaths, and a
variety of other methods to preserve impartiality) arguably have proven to
be effective. The repeat player problem raises two concerns: (1) that
experienced parties in arbitration will be more successful than those that
lack experience; and (2) that this success may be a product of systemic bias.
Although we find evidence that there may be merit to the first concern, we
find no support for the second claim. This result stands in contrast to
previous work on the subject.
B. Effects of FINRA's Changed Procedural Ruies^"
In 1999 FINRA amended its rules to provide stricter policies regarding
the arbitration of employment discrimination claims. The change in the
handling of these claims after 1999 provides us with a unique opportunity to
examine to what extent the procedures for handling such claims affect the
outcomes of these types of cases. From the inception of the employment
arbitration program through 1999, FINRA used mandatory arbitration for all
claims, including those alleging discrimination. Since 1999, registered
employees in the industry have had the option of using voluntary arbitration
to resolve discrimination claims (but all other types of claims are still
subject to mandatory arbitration).^' Critics maintain that mandatory
arbitration has a significant effect on arbitration outcomes: claimants, they
argue, are at a disadvantage under mandatory arrangements and arc likely to
receive lower awards than they would if they had the option of voluntary
arbitration. Recall, also, that a year after FINRA switched from mandatory
to voluntary procedures for handling discrimination claims, it enhanced the
procedures used for those claims.^ ^ Accordingly, we have the opportunity to
compare three distinct regimes governing employment discrimination
claims: a mandatory regime with somewhat loose procedures, a voluntary
50. Portions of this section are drawn or paraphrased from Lamare, Securities, supra note 6;
Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 6; and fi-om the unpublished manuscript, Lamare & Lipsky,
Resolving Discrimination Complaints, supra note 6.
51. Rule SR-NASD-1997-077, FiN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/
RuleFilings/1997/P009417 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
52. See Lamare & Lipsky, Resolving Discrimination Complaints, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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regime with these same procedures, and a voluntary regime with enhanced
procedures. Did the changes in regime type make a difference?
Table 2 provides the results. One major effect of the change was a
dramatic decline in the number of discrimination cases after 1999. From the
inception of the arbitration program through 1999, there were 220
discrimination awards. From 2000 through 2008 there were only 98
discrimination awards. There is no evidence that there was a sharp drop
after 1999 in the number of employees who had discrimination complaints.
Rather, the most reasonable explanation for the decline in discrimination
awards is that after 1999, when employees in the securities industry were no
longer compelled to arbitrate discrimination claims, most chose litigation
over arbitration.
Allegation Type:
D=Discrimination
O=Other
N
Mean Monetary
Award
Mean Percent of
Claim Awarded
Mean Monetary
Award
Mean Percent of
Claim Awarded
Mean Employee
Win Rate
Mandatory Arbitration
for All Allegations
D
220
$91,309
-2.6%
$183,022
20.7%
49.0%
0
593
$146,364
18.9%
$229,164
32.2%
65.2%
Voluntary for
Discrimination without
Rule Changes
D
18
$52,233
10.4%
$104,649
20.8%
50.0%
0
78
$156,690
21.9%
$238,329
30.8%
73.2%
Voluntary for
Discrimination with
Rule Changes
D
98
$157,890
17.1%
$311,073
32.7%
52.6%
3
0
739
$129,226
17.5%
$218,837
35.4%
63.6%
We discovered that the shift from mandatory to voluntary arbitration
did not seem to have an effect on the size of the awards in discrimination
cases, whereas the enhanced procedures did affect the size of the awards.
Through 1999, the mean award in discrimination cases was $91,309. In
1999 (the year when discrimination charges were voluntary but no rule
changes had occurred), the mean award in discrimination cases in fact fell,
53. Monetary awards are deflated to 1986 dollars. The first set of columns covers awards of cases
filed between May 1989 and January 1999. The second set of columns covers awards of cases filed
between January 1999 and January 2000. The third set of columns covers awards of cases filed between
January 2000 and 2006. Rows 3-5 exclude zeros.
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to $52,233. After 2000, under a voluntary regime with enhanced mies, the
mean award jumped to $157,890. We find similar evidence with regard to
the percent of the initial claim that was awarded by the arbitrator and the
mean employee win rate. In sum, our analysis of the FINRA data suggests
that there is no other factor that can explain both the noteworthy drop in the
number of discrimination cases and the significant increase in the size of
awards in those cases after 1999 other than the changes FINRA made in its
system of arbitration. By allowing discrimination cases to proceed to
litigation and, most importantly, providing a fair and balanced system for
those cases that went to arbitration—one that offered adequate due process
protections for complainants and impartial, well-trained arbitrators
knowledgeable about relevant statutes—FINRA brought about a dramatic
change in the handling of discrimination complaints in the securities
industry.
C Discrimination Charges Compared with Other Allegations^'^
How do cases arbitrated under the FINRA system involving allegations
of discrimination compare with cases involving other types of allegations?
Table 3 provides the results of comparisons between discrimination cases
and other types of cases. When considering all awards, individuals taking
discrimination cases to arbitration received monetary compensation that was
21.4 percent lower than those whose claims did not involve allegations of
discrimination.
Discrimination Cases
Other Allegations
Difference between
Discrimination and
Other Allegations
Mean Money Award
$108,488
$138,003
-21.4%***
Employee Win Rate
50.2%
64.8%
-29.1%***
Percent of Claim Awarded
14.9%
24.1%
-61.7%***
Additionally, similar findings are uncovered when measuring the
relative success rates of employees (as determined by the percentage of the
individual's claim amount awarded by the arbitrator). Over the twenty-year
period, only half of all employees taking discrimination cases to arbitration
won anything at all (compared with 64.8 percent of those alleging other
claims). When an arbitrator found merit in an employee's case, an
54. Portions of this section are drawn or paraphrased from Lamare, Securities, supra note 6, and
from the unpublished manuscript, Lamare & Lipsky, Resolving Discrimination Complaints, supra note 6.
55. *** = significant at the .01 level. Throughout Table 3, monetary awards are deflated to 1986
dollars. "Percent of Claim Awarded" includes zeros.
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individual with a discrimination claim won about twenty-nine percent of the
amount he or she initially demanded, whereas an individual with a non-
discrimination claim received over thirty-six percent of his or her request.
We discovered a similar difference when we looked at awards in which the
arbitrator found for the employer. Each of the differences between
outcomes for discrimination cases and outcomes for non-discrimination
cases is statistically significant at the ninety-five or ninety-nine percent
confidence level. In addition, the results remained robust when we applied
regression analysis to the data and controlled for initial claim amounts,
gender and repeat-player effects, case complexity, time, and geographic
location. There is, on the whole, clear evidence that employees taking
discrimination cases to arbitration received lower awards than those with
other types of claims.
D. Gender of the Parties Involved in Arbitration^^
The securities industry has not always been a hospitable place for
women. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that for most of its history,
the industry was a hostile environment for women. As Louise Marie Roth
has written:
Not so long ago—as recently as the mid-1980s—Wall Street was one big
men's club of smoked-filled rooms and strippers on the trading floor.
Women, to the degree that they were welcome at all, were relegated to roles
as secretaries and sex objects. Firms blatantly discriminated against the few
women who did fight to become traders, and court cases demonstrate a long
history of groping, name calling, come-ons, blocked mobility, and sexual
pranks."
Over the last fifteen years, major class action lawsuits were brought against
Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley charging those firms with
the improper treatment of women. Each firm paid out more than $100
million to resolve these lawsuits, although each firm denied that it had
engaged in any systematic discrimination against women.'*
In 2006 the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported
that about one-third of the "officials and managers" in the securities industry
were women, compared to nearly one-half in the banking, credit, and
56. Portions of this section are drawn or paraphrased fi-om Lipsky, Lamare, & Gupta, supra note 6.
57. LOUISE MARIE ROTH, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: GENDER AND MONEY ON WALL STREET
(2006). For a thorough description of the discriminatory conditions women faced on Wall Street through
the early part of this century, see SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE BOOM-BOOM ROOM (2002).
58. ROTH, .supra note 57.
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insurance industries.'^ Many observers contend that sexism continues to
plague the securities industiy.*° In 2010 women alleging sex discrimination
filed class action lawsuits against both Goldman Sachs and Bank of America
Merrill Lynch; both firms have denied that these suits have any merit.^'
Nevertheless, reports of "women fleeing Wall Street" have been abundant in
the financial and business press.^ ^ In the first decade of this century 141,000
women, or 2.6 percent of the female workforce, left the industry, while the
number of men working for Wall Street firms grew by 389,000, a 9.6
percent increase of the male workforce.*^ "The economic downturn
produced a talent pool overflowing with highly-qualified candidates, both
men and women, but evidence suggests that the bar for women to reenter
Wall Street is disproportionately high.'"^
hi the securities industry several reasons lead us to hypothesize that
women will do less well than men in arbitration cases. It is possible that the
reasons women fare poorly may stem from biases that exist in the arbitration
process itself Indeed, arbitrators themselves (whether male or female) may
be affected by a subtle form of bias. They may be unconsciously influenced
by deeply rooted cultural stereotypes about men and women. Without
realizing it, arbitrators may find more merit in claims brought by men as
compared to women, even when the claims are equally meritorious. Our
argument, however, does not necessarily rest on the premise that the
arbitrators or other participants in the FINRA arbitration process are
consciously or unconsciously biased against women. There are other
factors, we maintain, that may influence the relative success of men and
women in FINRA arbitration cases. These factors include, for example, the
possibility that employers have greater willingness to settle early in the
59. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFO. & PLANNING, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, DIVERSITY IN THE FINANCE INDUSTRY (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/reports/finance/finance.pdf.
60. See. e.g., Ellen Joan Pollock, Deportment Gap: In Today's Workplace. Women Feel Freer To
Be, Well Women, Floppy Bow Ties Give Way To More-Alluring Attire: Sex Banter Has Its Place.
Flirting—or Good Business? WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2010, at A20; Melinda Ligos, MANAGEMENT:
Escape Route From Sexist Attitudes on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2001),
http://wvm.nytimes.com/2001/05/30/ business/30FIDU.html.
61. See Bob Van Voris and Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Sued Over Alleged Gender
Discrimination, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-15/goldman-
sachs-sued-by-three-women-over-alleged-gender-discrimination.html; Mary Ellen Egan, Bank of
America and Merrill Lynch Sex Discrimination Lawsuit, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2010/03/31/bank-of-america-and-merrill-lynch-sex-
discrimination-lawsuit/.
62. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan, Terminated: Why the Women of Wall Street Are Disappearing,
FORBES (February 26, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0316/072 terminated_women.html.
63. Charles Wallace, Women on Wall Street: As Many Leave the Industry, Some Leave in Fear,
DAILY FINANCE (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.dailyfmance.com/2010/09/16/women-on-wall-street-as-
many-leave-the-industry-some-live-in-f/.
64. Sylvia Ann Hewlitt, Women on Wall Street and Their Hidden Challenges, HARV. BUS. REV.
BLOG (Apr. 21, 2010), http:/^logs.hbr.org/2010/04/pay-parity-pitfalls-hidden-chay.
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process with women to avoid potentially high-profile gender discrimination
cases. Another factor might be that the gender of the claimant (and the
gender of the claimant's attorney) serves as a proxy for experience. Brokers
with greater experience tend to earn more than brokers with less experience,
and awards are based largely on unpaid compensation. Therefore, since
male brokers in general have more experience than female brokers, their
back pay awards would be larger than the back pay awards obtained by
female claimants.
Employee is Male
Employee's Attorney is Male
Employer's Attorney is Male
Arbitrator is Male
Percent-Based Measure
of Award Outcomes
Positive Effect on Employee
Outcomes
Positive Effect
on Employee Outcomes
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
Absolute Measure
of Award Outcomes
Positive Effect
on Employee Outcomes
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
No Effect on Awards
Table 4: Gender Effects within the FINRA System
Table 4 provides the results of gender effects on arbitration awards; the
results are based on a regression analysis of our data that controls for other
relevant variables. We find that female employees and female employee
attorneys receive lower awards than do male employees and male employee
attorneys. However, we do not conclude from this that the FINRA system is
biased toward women. Consider our finding that the gender of the arbitrator
does not affect the relative size of the award. We did not find, for example,
that male employees obtained larger awards from male arbitrators, nor did
we find that female employees obtained larger awards from female
arbitrators. Rather, we found that male employees did better than female
employees regardless of the gender of the arbitrator. In our view, this
finding provides at least limited support for our belief that FINRA
arbitrators do not overtly discriminate against women. We suspect that
gender in our results might plausibly be a proxy for other factors that
infiuence the experience of men and women in the FINRA arbitration
process, but unfortunately we lack the data to test this assertion more fully.
E. Past Arbitration Awards ' Effect on Current Cases
The final question we ask in this paper relates to the concept of
independence between arbitration awards. To what extent are the
65. Controls: hearing location, case complexity, initial amount claimed, party characteristics,
allegations, time.
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employment arbitration awards obtained by employers independent of
previous awards they have obtained? Are employers affected by the results
of prior hearings, or do they treat each arbitration case as a unique event?
This question is difficult to answer empirically, and there is no
literature of which we are aware that has attempted to study the issue. An
initial assumption is that flrms learn from their prior awards. The logic
behind this assumption is that a company, acting strategically, will consider
its institutional history when confronting a given arbitration case and its
strategy for that case will depend on the company's prior experiences. This
in part helps to explain the repeat-player flndings reported earlier.
However, deeper consideration makes this theory more ambiguous. We
might expect that a firm's overall experience with FINRA arbitration
beneflts that flrm, as the theory suggests, but the idea that an award depends
on the flrm's immediate prior outcome may be illogical. Firms, and their
employees, are highly diverse entities, and it is not necessarily the case that
an arbitrator's ruling on, say, a breach of contract case filed at the flrm's
Kansas City office would have any bearing on a subsequent discrimination
charge filed at the flrm's New York City branch.
With our data, we are able to test explicitly the extent to which a
company's given arbitration outcome is affected by the award preceding it.
In essence, we can test whether companies learn from (or depend in any way
on) the most recent past award when they go to arbitration. Although we
cannot provide a more nuanced measure of corporate learning in this regard,
we are at least able to introduce the concept through empirical analysis.
To answer this question, we rely on statistical tests for the presence of
autocorrelation between the data. In the absence of autocorrelation, it is fair
to assume that each of the arbitration awards obtained by a given flrm
operates independently of the flrm's other awards. However, if
autocorrelation is found to be present, this indicates that the company's
arbitration outcome is affected by some earlier case. In this instance, we lag
the results by one time period (that is, we measure the correlation at time
one and compare it to the correlation at time two) to test whether the
employer's immediate prior award shaped the employer's award in the
current case.
We ran empirical tests and flnd no evidence for the presence of
autocorrelation within our data. However, we do not interpret this finding as
necessarily suggesting that each arbitration case should be viewed as a
unique event in the company's arbitration experience. It may be that flrms
do indeed pay attention to earlier awards when handling a given case, but
only when those earlier cases match the current case in speciflc ways. For
instance, a flrm's Los Angeles attorneys might examine the company's
performance in discrimination cases in that region and learn from those
speciflc experiences—a notion again supported by our repeat-player
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findings. Although we carmot perform such nuanced tests of this concept
using our data, we encourage researchers to consider measuring for
autocorrelation in their analyses of arbitration awards over time.
CONCLUSION
Our examination of employment arbitration in the securities industry
produces a mixed picture—one that does not entirely support either the
proponents or the opponents to mandatory workplace arbitration. For
example, we find strong evidence of a repeat-player effect in the securities
industry, to some degree replicating the findings of both Bingham and
Colvin in their analyses of AAA cases. Our analysis has the advantage of
avoiding some of the limitations of earlier studies of the repeat-player
hypothesis. Because we have data on all employment arbitration cases
arising in the securities industry from the inception of the program, our
analysis avoids the truncation bias of earlier studies; also, we have been able
to test whether the repeat-player effect is a phenomenon related to the
experience of the firm or, on the other hand, a phenomenon related to the
experience of the attomeys representing the disputants. Our findings
strongly support the view that the repeat-player effect is a consequence of
the experience of the firm and not the firm's attomey.
Opponents of employment arbitration may use this evidence to support
their contention that employment arbitration does not provide a level playing
field for the disputants but inherently favors employers. However, in
contrast to Colvin, we find no evidence that the repeat pairings of an
arbitrator and an employer-respondent in the securities industry results in
outcomes that favor the employer. Our evidence suggests that the
procedural safeguards that FINRA has put in place over the years have
mitigated the advantages of repeat players—a finding that should provide a
lesson for other providers of arbitration services.
Similarly, our findings cast light on whether mandatory arbitration,
compared to voluntary arbitration, puts employee-plaintiffs at a
disadvantage. The significant change in the mies goveming employment
arbitration in the securities industry in 1999 and 2000 allowed us to test the
effects of mandatory arbitration on outcomes in discrimination cases. On
the one hand, we found that the change from a mandatory to a voluntary
arbitration program for discrimination complaints significantly decreased the
number of discrimination claims resulting in arbitration awards. Presumably
after 1999 most discrimination cases were litigated rather than arbitrated.
On the other hand, consistent with our finding on the repeat-player
effect, FINRA's mle changes in 2000, designed to enhance the faimess and
due process protections of complaints in discrimination cases, proved to
have a very significant positive effect on the outcomes obtained by
complainants in arbitration cases. Again, the mies FINRA used to protect
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employee-disputants appear to have had dramatic effects on arbitration
awards, suggesting that procedural safeguards may be more important than
whether an arbitration program is mandatory or voluntary.*^
But our analysis also suggests that employees in the sectirities industry
with discrimination complaints fared less well than employees with other
types of claims. Again, we lack the data to estimate what employees with
discrimination complaints might have received had they litigated their
claims. What we have uncovered, however, h prima facie evidence that, all
other things considered, in the securities industry arbitrators treat employees
with discrimination complaints less favorably than they treat employees with
non-discrimination claims. This result may stem from the fact that
arbitrators are more reluctant to find that an employer has violated a statute
than they are to find that an employer has breached a contract.
Lastly, we find that, controlling for other relevant factors, women have
obtained lower arbitration awards than men in the securities industry. On
the one hand, critics might add this finding to their arsenal of objections to
employment arbitration. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that the
effect of gender on arbitration awards probably results from long-standing
employment practices in the securities industry and not from the nature of
the arbitration process itself Clearly, there is no evidence to support the
proposition that arbitrators consciously discriminate against women
complainants in the industry.
In sum, in common with other researchers, we find that employment
arbitration in the securities industry potentially has defects identified by
critics of the practice. However, we also find that the regime of rules used
by the provider can substantially correct those defects. For instance, where
other arbitral forums (namely, AAA) have been studied, evidence indicates
that there is at least the potential for bias to affect arbitration outcomes.
However, in our study of FINRA, using generally comparable data, we find
no such evidence of bias. As such, we argue that employment arbitration
systems should not be considered monolithic in nature - the problems with
arbitration that might have occurred under one regime may be less present,
or nonexistent, under a different system. Specifically, we maintain that the
FINRA approach to arbitration serves as a useftil template for designing a
system that limits many of the concerns around employment arbitration. The
FINRA system has strict arbitrator training and disclosure requirements
(especially for discrimination claims), employs a randomized and automated
selection process, and makes arbitrator decisions publicly available.
Although we accept and indeed advocate for the position that ADR
programs are not monolithic, we hold that, if other dispute resolution forums
66. We acknowledge that a more definitive answer to this question would require an examination
of how securities employees with discrimination complaints fared in litigation; regrettably, we do not
have the data to address this question.
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were to adopt some or all of these protocols, it is conceivable that they
would find similar levels of success in promoting arbitration fairness.
